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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

CONSIDERING THE HUMAN AND NONHUMAN IN LITERARY STUDIES:
NOTES FOR A BIOGRAPHIC NETWORK APPROACH FOR THE STUDY OF LITERARY
OBJECTS
In recent years critical projects spanning philosophy, the social sciences, science studies,
and nearly everywhere that has employed the term ecology have engaged in thinking
humans and non-humans together as collectively producing outcomes, where objects do
work beyond how humans perceive or make use of them. Taking Zelda Fitzgerald’s Save
Me the Waltz as its focus, this thesis explores how this reorientation might contribute to
literary studies and to literary criticism more specifically. The thesis considers a notion
that novels constitute objects with biographies running “against” the biographic material
of their authors, mobilizes actor network theory as a manner of mapping that biographic
assemblage, and tentatively develops a biographic network approach as one alternative to
traditional literary interpretative practices. Attending to the novel as an actor shifts
critical focus away from its interior – the “text” or content – and expands traditional
literary criticism’s default practice – interpretation – and logic – mimetic representation –
in hopes of facilitating a discussion of Zelda’s novel in a manner which destabilizes the
overdetermined themes that continue to scaffold her imaginary. Ultimately, this work
argues that a biographic network approach can prove instructive as a “method” for
dealing with other texts which remain relatively obscured at the margins of literary
consciousness.
KEYWORDS: Zelda Fitzgerald, human and nonhuman, actor-network and assemblage,
biography, interpretation and representation
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Chapter1: Networks and Objects
The Thesis: Introduction
This thesis does not simply begin with this stretch of words. It has passed through
the hands and emails of committee members and readers, changed and formed by the
interventions and comments made by them. It has also been molded by conference
presentations, conversations, and small epiphanies garnered from others still.
Departmental requirements, formatting guidelines from The Graduate School, and word
processing programs have also had their say. In places it has suffered or benefited
because of other obligations, or states of mind. In all places, the document results from
contingencies, connections and relationships with other beings, both human and
nonhuman. In other words, the processes and engagements producing this document can
be mapped – a network. Following Bruno Latour, the term network refers to “a concept,
not a thing out there” like a city grid, a corporate management structure, or a subway
system. As Latour notes, the term network operates as “a tool to help describe something,
not just what is being described” (Social 131).
I am describing the thesis as a mutually constructed and constructing set of
relationships, not all of which are visible, not all of which are human. For instance, this
thesis will appear nowhere in the degree that will be conferred, framed and hung on my
wall, deposited in a folder and placed in a trunk, or eventually misplaced and lost in a
move; even so, the materialization of that degree depends on this document and cannot
occur without it. Similarly, my committee and readers, Microsoft Word, The Graduate
School building will also appear nowhere in this object, but they are central to its
appearance. Even if absent, they are nevertheless, undeniably present: the committee and
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readers appear in content revisions and the scholarly and creative fields from which that
content is drawn; Microsoft and Word “reveal” themselves in the processing of the
document, its typography; and, as this document will be read into and remain in The
Graduate School’s servers and would not have been accepted there if the margins were
not 1.5” on the left and 1” on all other sides, these entities appear as well.
This thesis as an object, then, can be understood as “a pattern of absences and
presences.” Absent-presences, as John Law and Vicky Singleton call them, reveal objects
“as sets of present dynamics generated in, and generative of, realities that are necessarily
absent” (8). Describing the network of the thesis allows for an examination of the pattern
of absences and presences that have generated it. These dynamics, realities, and the actors
that operate with and because of them, all together, constitute a map of a network, or to
use another term, an assemblage. Even if this preliminary description of this thesis’
network is oversimplified and attenuated, as a few first lines of introduction it suffices.
They begin to unfold the map of a thesis imagined as a network, the connections that
have been formed amongst heterogeneous and irreducible actors, that even if absent, have
presence in this document, in the history of its being here. In presenting my thesis in this
way, I am after a view of the thesis that can itself be described as an object, beyond the
sheets of paper, or scrollable virtual pages present before you, but also that exceeds its
utility as a genre, or status as a medium for transmitting “the thesis,” in what we might
think of as its biography.
Reorientation
In recent years critics and theorists have increasingly engaged a project of
reimagining the division between humans and non-humans, the ways in which they relate
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and interact in the world. This revisioning involves, to borrow a phrase from Diane Coole
and Samantha Frost, a project of “ontological reorientation,” that is, affording nonhumans an ontological weight, a place alongside and with humans where they are
permitted and seen to do work beyond how humans perceive or make use of them (4).
Such attempts have been seen widely in philosophy, the social sciences, science studies,
and nearly everywhere that has employed the term ecology. What follows considers how
this reorientation might contribute to literary studies, and to literary criticism more
specifically; further, it attempts to articulate one possible approach to a critical literary
practice in a world so conceived, what I am calling a biographic network approach. The
exigence in developing such an approach is to consider how the critical examination of
literary works might proceed differently when works themselves are considered as
participants operating in a more ontologically robust world.
For this project I have chosen Zelda Fitzgerald’s only published novel Save Me
the Waltz. Relative to other literary works, particularly those of her husband F. Scott
Fitzgerald, Zelda’s novel has been little read. Even if not widely considered a literary
figure, she remains iconic and her biographical material is well known. Zelda’s novel,
then, invites us to shift critical focus away from a traditional literary hermeneutic project
of interpretation focused on the interior of the novel, “the text,” and to more closely
consider the literary object itself as an actor. An examination of Save Me as a novel
object requires placing a particular emphasis on Zelda’s biographical material, and more
specifically the biographies themselves. The work that Zelda’s biographies do is precisely
to trace and follow her movements through shifting networks of associations with a
multiplicity of actors – her childhood home in Alabama and World War I, flowers and
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ballet, automobiles and dance halls, Scott Fitzgerald and Ernest Hemingway, mental
institutions and psychiatry. In Zelda’s biographies the novel itself comes clearly into
view as a busy object around which multiple actors gather, organize and negotiate
outcomes. Recognizing the literary object as an actor allows for an articulation of the
novel’s own biography, a biography read “against” Zelda’s biography. By against I do
not mean in opposition to, but alongside of and in conjunction with: an ontologically flat
biography. Articulating the novel’s biography – including but necessarily moving beyond
its production and reception to consider how the novel continues to act in the present, in
the continual formation and reconstitution of critical networks, for instance – expands the
contents the term biography can hold.
Framing a critical discussion in terms of biography, or “life writing” – in all the
senses of process, articulation and emergence that this combination conjures – allows me
to ask how the life of Zelda and the life of her novel might appear differently in the
context of a literary practice where attention is shifted from the inside of texts to consider
the actual novel itself as an object around which networks are constructed and in whose
construction it continues to participate. Considering the novel in this way, as I discuss in
greater detail later, resists the bifurcation of human and nonhuman which a project of
reorientation intends to adjust; and similarly, in some measure, it hopes to trade the
tendency of interpretation to recreate the ideological assumptions of its methods in the
prescription of meaning(s) for a reconsideration of ideologies themselves as objects,
which participate in networks, but that do not necessarily determine their arrangement.
Network, Rhizome
As a tool for examining the network of Zelda’s novel – its production,
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appearance, circulation, and the work it does as it conjoins with and is taken up by other
non-human and human actors – I use the “actor network” approach developed by Bruno
Latour, John Law, and Michel Callon, among others. In addition to Latour’s network, I
also mobilize Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s notions of assemblage and rhizome.
The terms carry roughly the same orientations and require the same procedures. As Law
points out, “Latour has observed that we might talk of ‘actant rhizomes’ rather than ‘actor
networks,’” and assemblage and actor network share little difference: “[b]oth refer to the
provisional assembly of productive, heterogeneous, and… quite limited forms of ordering
located in no larger overall order” (Law and Singleton 146). Each requires mappings and
the identification of paths, circulations and flows, and the marking of connections and
associations made between multiform actors – humans, nonhumans, and discourses. I use
the terms network and assemblage and rhizome interchangeably throughout – both
network and assemblage are rhizomatic:
any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other…[it] ceaselessly
establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and
circumstances relative to the arts, sciences and social struggles. […] A rhizome
has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things…where it
picks up speed…a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other way…
(Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand 7, 25 italics in original).
The multidirectionality, betweeness, and connectability the rhizome articulates provides a
way of conceptualizing the back and forth and across of circulations. It accounts for the
shifting character of a reader’s resources that can be brought to a particular object or
context, and the ways in which that network itself is continuously remade and
retranslated as new connections come available or old associations dissolve. It can
account for continuity, change, and sites of rupture. “A rhizome may be broken, shattered
at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines”
5

(Thousand 9). Following Zelda’s novel as it appears, disappears and reappears on both
old and new lines in its publication history provides an illustration of rhizomatic work.
After its initial publication in 1932, Zelda’s novel, selling less than 1,500 copies
would almost entirely disappear, its line of publication broken. This line would start up
again with its publication in England in 1953, and later in the U.S. in 1967. It has
remained in publication since (in jumps and starts), and in 1991 it would surface in The
Collected Writings of Zelda Fitzgerald. What is interesting about this collection is that
her short stories, many of which were originally published either under Scott’s name or
with his name attached (his name fetched higher payments) appear in the volume with a
footnote detailing its original attribution. Whether these footnotes are provided as
historical detail or to attribute a certain academic ethos for the editor is uncertain, but the
question arises: why, in a volume so titled, preserve the attribution? In any case, the
footnoting points towards the identification of an entangled “authorship line” which has
not yet entirely “shattered.”
The novel also appears in the biographies concerning Zelda. While I do not trace
this biographic line in a comprehensive way in this thesis, I do consider Zelda’s
biographies as objects and networks. However, I would mention here a recent extension
of this line. 1 In 2011 a graphic biography of Zelda’s life has appeared in Italy, and again,
in English translation, in 2013. 2 No new information or resources come to light in this
graphic rendition, but the form and media are in themselves interesting. Further, three
novels about Zelda were published in 2013, articulating a derivative line that can be
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For a detailed examination of the major biographies about Zelda, see Taylor xix-xxi.
Lo Porto, Tizania and Daniele Marotta. Superzelda: The Graphic Life of Zelda Fitzgerald. Trans.
Anthony Shugaar. Canada: One Place Books. 2013.Print.
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considered. 3 The novel’s publication, biographic and derivative networks begin to trace
the ways in which the novel itself circulates in rhizomatic extensions – territorializing
new spaces and itself territorialized by other works.
Since the project at hand seeks to work within a broadened ontological
framework, what is meant by an object should be briefly discussed. Latour has used the
terms “actor” and “actant” to stand in for “objects, subjects, human beings, machines,
animals, ‘nature,’ ideas, organizations, inequalities, scale and sizes, and geographical
arrangements [etc.]” ( Law 141). His terms impress upon us the notions of performance
and activity that objects exert in networks. While I also use his terms, most often I simply
use the term object, but with the understanding that the activity expressed in Latour’s
terms be preserved, and that the beings in the litany above are included in its scope of
reference. I use the term object because it invites us to consider the ways in which any
object we point to has being in the world, and to reflect upon its relationship to ourselves
and to other objects, the entanglements within which it can be concerned. Towards this
more metaphysical consideration of objects, I draw on the object oriented philosophy of
Graham Harman which considers objects to have their own independent reality and ways
of being, unexhausted by how humans use and perceive them (the novel on the shelf, as
texts to interpret).The term object, Harman explains:
…must include those entities that are neither physical nor even real. Along with
diamonds, rope, and neutrons, objects may include armies, monsters, square
circles, and leagues of real and fictitious nations. All such objects must be
accounted for by ontology, not merely denounced or reduced to despicable
nullities. Yet…I have never held that all objects are “equally real.” For it is false
that dragons have autonomous reality in the same manner as a telephone pole. My
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Erica. Call Me Zelda. New York: New American Library. 2013.Print.; and, Spargo, Clifton R. Beautiful
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point is not that all objects are equally real, but they are equally objects
(Quadruple 5 italics in original).
If a rhizome can forge connections between “semiotic chains, organizations of
power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences and social struggles,” an object
orientation can consider how these many entities and networks are also objects. While
any term that does the work of ontological “flattening” – that is, figuring the human and
non-human as mutually constituting in their relations while also resisting the grant of
privilege to one or the other in any described network – is useful, not all terms, such as
“thing” for instance, are equally so. What the terms object and thing do not do equally is
reduce the drag that the categories of human and non-human possess in the process of
thinking them together. The term actually works to create distance.
Before discussing how “thing” complicates this sense of relation and collectivity,
it should be mentioned here that thinking humans and nonhumans together does not mean
thinking them “the same.” As Latour points out, the purpose of an actor network
approach is not “the establishment of some absurd ‘symmetry between humans and
nonhumans.’” Rather, to think in terms of symmetry “means not to impose a priori some
spurious asymmetry among human intentional action and a material world of casual
relations” (Social 76 italics in original). In other words, objects, even if not “equally
real,” participate in “the enactment of materially and discursively heterogeneous
relations” that network(s) attempt to map and follow.
However, to say that objects act and do work requires some kind of explanation.
Susan Reynolds Whyte, Sjaak Van der Geest and Anita Hardon offer a very usable
framework for dealing with the question in the context of medicine. I quote it at length,
not only because it is well put, but because mobilizing their use of the term “thing”
3

provides a jumping off point to facilitate a further discussion of terms.
…things alone do not have a social life. At most they can be seen as agents in the
sense argued by actor-network theorists: they form parts of complexes that coproduce effects in particular situations; things and people both can be seen as
actors in that they mutually constitute one another… But even if one does not
accept the radical position that things and people are equally agents, it is
essential…to describe the lives that medicines have with people and between
people (14).
First, as Bill Brown has noticed, the term “thing” can act “as placeholder for some
future specifying operation”. In the passage above, Whyte et al. mobilize the word to
stand for anything, to hold a place later occupied by “medicines.” Second, the word
“thing” notes an ambiguity, not just in the matter of what is unspecified, but a sense of
“what is excessive in objects, as what exceeds their utilization of objects – their force as a
sensuous presence or as a metaphysical presence, the magic by which objects become
values, fetishes, idols, and totems” (5). Both senses of the term can be illustrated in a
discussion between Scott, Zelda, and her then psychiatrist Dr. Rennie, which ran to 114
pages.
After Save Me the Waltz, Zelda produced a forty-thousand word manuscript on
Nijinsky and insanity which infuriated Scott. Being in the middle of Tender is the Night,
which centered on psychiatry and (Zelda’s) madness, he considered the topic off limits.
His insistences Zelda stop writing forms the occasion for the meeting. Scott repeatedly
“called Zelda’s novel ‘the thing’ or ‘that thing.’ (Rennie and Zelda followed his use of
the word.) […] Scott’s novel [Tender is the Night] was never called a thing” (Cline 333).
On the one hand, Zelda’s new novel, which has been “lost,” when referred to as a thing
becomes a place holder for the novel which in Scott’s mind should not become a “future
operation,” and on the other, it invokes the threat, “its excess” which Scott perceived the
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novel to represent to his own status as a “professional” writer and literary figure. Brown
notes: “Things lie beyond the grid of intelligibility…outside the order of objects” (5). As
we have seen in the passages above, nothing exists outside the “order of objects.” What is
excessive in objects is already a quality which they obtain. The term “object,” then,
points towards something concrete, even if that object is not immediately named, or
tangible.
The project undertaken recognizes a more robust ontological field, attempts to
follow and describe the literary object itself, and comes with a caveat for traditional
literary critique: a dramatic pressure is exerted on two of its most central and
codependent terms – interpretation and representation. At their most basic, these terms
point towards the book as binary – the inside, a content interpreted by a mind as a
correlation to the outside, the “real” world, a historical context, a structure, or set of
power relations the content in some way represents, or to which it is reduced as an effect.
The “biographical” reading I propose resists these twin consequences of traditional
literary hermeneutics: bifurcation and ideology.
Bifurcation and Ideology
What is common to all modes of literary critical interpretation remains the notion
that literary texts are mimetic, that is, the interior of the text (content) offers a
representation, or in some way reflects in its composition (either in faithful rendition or
by purposeful distortion), a recognizable “real” world outside. Representational logic
concretizes bifurcations – the inside and outside, the human and the non-human, the
subject and object – which the notion of network and assemblage describe together and
do not recognize as such. “Representation,” as David Rudrum points out, “offers a single
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conception of what narrative is that is simultaneously a prescription for what it does”
(202). In this “single conception,” interpretation attends to what is represented in the
story world, presumably with a correlation to what is in the world which produces it and
which the text reproduces. The problem for this thesis, in its bid to bridge the gap
between inside and outside, the human and the non-human, is precisely the way in which
the circuit of representation and interpretation reproduce these divisions; we quickly
recognize bifurcation as the circuits’ founding logic.
Although interpretations are always partial, they tend towards the prescription of
meaning(s), allowing some and prohibiting others, and in the process mobilize and
demobilize various ideologies. In as much as interpretative activity displays a tendency to
recreate the ideological assumptions of its methods, it exhibits a related tendency of
subsuming its exegetical object in its own discourse, disappearing the text in the
hermeneutic activity of the interpreter. In regards to literary studies, for instance, the
mode of criticism – new critical, new historicist, reader response, and so on – and a
critic’s particular theoretical leaning – structuralist, post-structuralist, deconstructive,
psychoanalytic, Marxist, and so on – determine the parameters of what can be brought to
the discussion of a text – the historical context, the author’s biography, social structure,
etc. – and in many ways determine the outcome of the criticism – the text as an
in(de)terminable play of signs, as a projection of authorial desire, as a reproduction of
cultural forms, etc.
The task in reimaging interpretative activity is not to deny ideology its place in
“the order of objects.” Ideologies are objects, potentially active as actors in networks, but
not sufficient in themselves as explanations of meaning. Catherine Belsey points out:
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meaning “is not spectral and singular, but substantial and plural” (182). The multiplicity
of meaning in and of itself is not problematic. A problem of meaning is not what a
network approach hopes to address, per se, but what Deleuze identifies as “a problem of
use” (qtd. in Smith xxii). Meaning attends to content, over-determining what is in the text
because it simultaneously under-determines what the text does. Or, as Susan Sontag
writes, “Interpretation, based on the highly dubious theory that a work of art is composed
of items of content, violates art. It makes art into an article for use, for arrangement into a
mental scheme of categories” in which the work of art itself disappears (as if it could)
(10). Further, and perhaps invariably, ideologies point towards structures, either by
building or attempting to disassemble them. A network conception provides an
alternative to the building and tearing down of structures (systems) which attend
ideologies, and that traditional interpretation reproduces.
Critique of Two Modes
Graham Harman’s critiques of New Criticism and New Historicism provide
illustrations of how the problems of bifurcation and ideology have troubled literary
criticism, at least in terms of these modes. Taking Cleanth Brook’s The Well Wrought
Urn as representative, Harman takes issue with New Criticism’s insistence that
interpretative activity must be confined to the world of the text itself, its own specific
contextual reality, where “its interior [is turned] into a relational wildfire in which all
individual elements are consumed.” The walls of the story world must never be breached;
the text itself a fixed unity, interpretation must be kept to the inside (content). For
instance, a character changing their shirt in a text can become crucial to the meaning of
the text, a proposition that Harman counters by offering a scene from everyday life:
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changing my shirt at the last minute before boarding the bus certainly affects ‘the
overall context’ of the bus ride, yet it would not have any discernible effect on the
bus or most of the passengers riding it… What is truly interesting about ‘contexts’
is not that they utterly define every entity to the core, but that they open a space
where certain interactions can take place and not others (“Hammer” 191 italics in
original).
If, as Harman says, New Criticism “severed literary texts from the world but
turned their interiors into contextual houses of mirrors where everything reflects
everything else,” then New Historicism “tacitly dissolves literary works into a house of
mirrors that is now ubiquitous and is held to define the whole of reality” (195). Harman
quotes at length from H. Aram Veeser’s introduction to The New Historicism to show
that New Historicism falters on two accounts. First, Veeser contends notions of an
“autonomous self and text are mere holograms, effects that intersecting institutions
produce; that selves and texts are defined by their relations to hostile others…and
disciplinary power” (qtd. in “Hammer” 193). Harman notices “there are few traces of
nonhuman entities amidst all this discussion of mutually conditioning forces,” e.g.
culture, society, and power. “What we find instead is a historicism of the human subject
as shaped by various disciplinary practices.” Harman argues that an attention to power
and discourse, such as in Veeser’s phrase “culture and society,”
does not encompass an especially diverse range of entities. For the world also
contains parakeets, silver, limestone, coral reefs, solar flares, and moons, none of
them easy to classify as ‘culture’ or ‘society,’ and all of them interacting with
each other whether humans discuss it or not (192-193).
Secondly, when viewed as effects of hegemonic power, culture and society, and Latour
makes this point as well, all contexts become universal (195). It is not enough, then, to
focus either on context or on historical and social conditions. Harman points out:
The same social era produced [Zelda Fitzgerald], Jackson Pollock, Patricia
Highsmith, Frank Sinatra, and President Truman, but to ascribe them all to this
8

era vastly understates the widely different temperaments and talents on this list.
The call for ‘the death of the author’ needs to be complemented by a new call for
‘the death of the culture.’ Rather than emphasize the social conditions that gave
rise to any given work, we ought to do the contrary, and look at how works
reverse or shape what might have been expected in their time and place, or at how
some withstand the earthquakes of the centuries much better than others (201).
What is resisted in a move away from interpretation, as Harman’s accounts of
New Criticism and New Historicism attest, is the turning of Zelda’s novel – or Zelda
herself – into one or another of these houses of mirrors. What is ultimately lost in the mis
en abyme of reflection is the object being reflected. In the case of New Criticism, the
novel, and in the case of New Historicism, it is both the novel and Zelda herself.
Resisting the text as hermetically sealed or the text as a historical product of power opens
other possibilities for considering Zelda’s novel and her biography in new combinations.
While the novel must be a set of concerns, humans and nonhumans, differentially
powered social relations – Zelda and her husband, Zelda as amateur and Scott as expert –
and discourses – marriage and psychiatry – it is not only one of these at any one time; it
is materially, socially, historically, and discursively situated all at once and remains
irreducible to any one contextualization alone.
Latour notes:
[…] we are always […] crisscrossing, as often as we have to, the divide that
separates exact knowledge and the exercise of power - let us say nature and
culture. […] To shuttle back and forth, we rely on the notion of translation, or
network. More supple than the notion of system, more historical than the notion
of structure, more empirical than the notion of complexity, the idea of network is
the Ariadne's thread of these interwoven stories. Yet our work remains
incomprehensible, because it is segmented into three components corresponding
to our critics' habitual categories. They turn it into nature, politics or discourse
(Modern 3).
By invoking Ariadne and the ball of thread she gave to Tiresias to navigate the
Minotaur’s maze, Latour figures a network as a following: “a network is not made… of
9

words or any durable substance but is the trace left behind of some moving agent” (Social
132). System, structure, and complexity fail to account for the nuance, changeability, and
collectivity exhibited in the actual processes and engagements through which meanings
and practices materialize at all. Suggesting stability and unity, constructions such as
“social structure” and “systems of power,” although recognized as complex, nevertheless
separate and then disappear both subjects and objects into categorical registers of “facts,
power, and discourse.” Rejecting the notion that these registers are separable, networks
“are neither objective nor social, nor are they effects of discourse, even though they are
real, and collective, and discursive”(Modern 6).
In nearly identical terms, Deleuze and Guattari explain:
[…an] assemblage, in its multiplicity, necessarily acts on semiotic flows, material
flows, and social flows simultaneously (independently of any recapitulation that
may be made of it in a scientific or theoretical corpus). (Thousand 23).
Both concepts – network and assemblage – resist a mode of critique that focuses
too long on one register or flow –material, social, or semiotic – at the expense of another,
which are always simultaneously operative. Latour notices that attending only to facts or
“naturalized phenomena” – the material flow – causes “societies, subjects and all forms
of discourse [to] vanish.” Likewise, a singular attention to “fields of power” – the social
flow – causes “texts and the contents of activities [to] disappear (Modern 6). Lastly, when
critique peers too long through the lens of discourse – the semiotic flow –the result is “a
society made up solely of false consciousness, simulacra and illusions” (64). The notions
of network and assemblage, then, work towards the analytic goal of keeping these
simultaneously occurring “flows” and irreducible categories confluent and related. They
enable the mapping of collectives, gatherings of entities, associations, and connections,
no part of which is solely reducible to “facts, power or discourse,” or as importantly, their
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effects. “It is the same thing,” Deleuze writes, “to sin through an excess of reality as
through an excess of imagination” (Immanence 2).
Again, we can follow Sontag:
Our task is not to find the maximum amount of content in a work of art,
much less to squeeze more content out of the work than is already there. Our task
is to cut back content so that we can see the thing at all.
The aim of all commentary on art now should be to make works of art and, by analogy, our own experience - more, rather than less, real to us. The
function of criticism should be to show how it is what it is, even that it is what it
is, rather than to show what it means (14 italics in original).
Much in line with Sontag’s exhortations that criticism’s function “should be to show how
it is what it is, even that it is what it is,” Harman has identified alternative critical projects
that focus on the literary object itself. For instance, he suggests changing punctuation and
words to see if the “feeling” or “overtones” of passages of the work itself changes. He
expands this notion of modification to the cutting out and adding of parts, changing and
shifting the contexts of the narrative (moving rural settings to urban ones for instance). In
contrast to contextualization, Harman’s suggestions “involve ways of decontextualizing
works, whether through examining how they absorb and resist their conditions of
production, or by showing that they are to some extent autonomous even from their own
properties” (202).
In many ways any questions that might arise regarding the ability of Save Me the
Waltz to “absorb and resist [its] conditions of production” are already built into the
biography of the novel. The first publication of Zelda’s novel in 1932 make clear that
matters of word choice and punctuation affect the way a novel is perceived. Zelda’s florid
and highly figurative writing style combined with Scribner’s “sloppy” proof editing
resulted in comments from reviewers such as this from the New Yorker:
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It is not only that her publisher’s have not seen fit to curb an almost ludicrous
lushness of writing but they have not given the book the elementary services of a
literate proofreader (prt. in Milford 263).
A “corrected” edition was published in England in 1953, and later in the U.S. in 1967
(this is the text presented by Matthew Bruccoli in The Collected Writings of Zelda
Fitzgerald, and which I use here) (Collected 5). The text, according to Bruccoli, contains
around “550 emendations” (“A Note on the Text”). It is difficult to know if more
“competent” proof editing or a less stylized language would have altered the mixed
critical reception the book received.
Further, Harman’s suggestion to add and delete sections already poses contentious
critical questions for the novel as it emerged in its published (1932) form. It is impossible
to know the composition of the novel that Zelda wrote. Initially, after completing the
manuscript in just six weeks, writing for an allotted 2 hours a day, Zelda had intended to
send the novel to Scott, but instead switched the mailing address and sent it directly to
Scott’s publisher Max Perkins at Scribner’s. Much enraged, Scott had the novel returned
to him and insisted on heavily revising the book (Taylor 259). While the extensiveness of
the cuts is unknown (the original manuscript has been lost), Zelda biographer Kendall
Taylor estimates that “almost a third of the book [around 100 pages], including the entire
middle section” was suppressed. She notes, the cuts “rendered the book far less
coherent.” Further, Taylor writes:
Only after the manuscript met with his approval did [Scott] finally give the goahead for publication. But it was a vastly different book from the one that Zelda
had written, and badly disjointed because of the cuts. A member of Scribner’s
promotion department, who had seen the original version, confided to Tony
Buttia, proprietor of the Intimate Book Shop in Asheville, North Carolina, that
Zelda’s version had been very provocative, including vindictive attacks on Scott
as writer and husband and scandalous material about their private life (260).
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Harman’s claim that “we cannot identify the literary work with the exact current
form it happens to have” seems especially relevant to Save Me the Waltz (“Hammer”
201). Even in this brief tracing of the novel, as it passed from Zelda’s hands in the clinic,
to Scribner’s, and back to Scott, under whose supervision it was drastically remade (but
whose original form a confidence between a Scriber’s employee and a book shop owner
sheds some light), the diagram of a network emerges, the novel as object assembled and
transformed in its passings. The question, then, of speculating on how the novel absorbed
or resisted changes and deletions is a lively one. Would the novel have been more
“coherent,” less disjointed, better received? Can the lack of coherence and fluidity which
are sometimes noted as pathological markers in the novel be considered otherwise, as a
consequence of its material production? 4 In what ways does it articulate the world in
which it was and is a part?
Articulation and Emergence
Narrowly conceived, traditional models of interpretation and representation lack
the critical agility to function well in a network or assemblage approach and require
expansion to encompass the notions of what I am calling articulation and emergence. I
derive the term articulation from Latour. Articulation moves beyond a subject centered
and explanatory vision of interpretative activity and comes from the other direction, the
emergence of a world that language voices and records, rather than reproduces. Latour
notes: “it is the world itself that is articulated” (Modes 256 italics in original). Put
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Although not examined here in detail, another direction that Harman’s suggestions can be exercised
involve the addition and deletion of Zelda’s writings from Scott’s novels: how the reproduction of her
diaries, which disappeared, and the excerpts from her psychiatric files, would affect the continuity and
material make up of his novels. These considerations go beyond a notion of intertextuality I think, and are
perhaps best understood in terms of a network of conjunctions, not only amongst the texts themselves, but
as in the inter-associations of persons, novels, diaries, and medical files.
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another way, the world gives utterance to itself.
The concept of emergence more closely approximates what Deleuze and Guattari
have called becoming. They write: “Becoming is never imitating” (Thousand 305).
Likewise, as Daniel W. Smith points out, for Deleuze “reading a text is never an act of
interpretation,” instead it comprises an “experiment,” an attempt to grasp writing as a
process of becoming, “a passage of Life that traverses both the livable and the lived”
(Smith li, Critical 1-2). The analytical power these augmenting terms afford derives
precisely from their ability to imagine processes (translations) instead of separations
(representations) and contingencies (networks) instead of effects (ideologies). They
capture the notion of processes occurring simultaneously out of and into a world
composed of minds and things rather than the process of a mind discerning what is
outside of it; as such, these terms resist bifurcation, decenter ideology, and confer status
to the novel as an object in the world with its own biography.
Expanding the conceptual and analytic capacities of interpretation and
representation is especially important for Zelda’s novel because of its connection to
mental illness. The Zelda imaginary which privileges her “madness” still persists and
finds currency in the critical and popular discourse that surrounds her and her novel. 5
Zelda figures as a Southern Bell turned proto-flapper whose claim to literary status rests
not with her own accomplishments – her writing, her ballet, and her art – but in “the fact”
that she was the insane wife of F. Scott Fitzgerald. The synopsis on the back cover of the
bestselling 2011 reissue of Zelda, Nancy Milford’s 1970 biography, portrays precisely
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I have chosen to focus on the aspect of madness in regards to Zelda, rather than the equally as important
and pervasive dysfunctional marriage narrative that attends her, although, this aspect is discussed in the
section on Critical Objects. In any case, the two circumstances are undoubtedly deeply entangled, both as
facts and perhaps, as some biographers and critics have asserted, causally.
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what I call the Zelda imaginary:
Zelda Sayre began as a Southern beauty, became an international wonder, and
died by fire in a madhouse. With her husband, F. Scott Fitzgerald, she moved in a
golden aura of excitement, romance, and promise. The epitome of the Jazz Age,
together they rode the crest of the era to its collapse and their own. […] Zelda
traces the inner disintegration of a gifted, despairing woman, torn by the clash
between her husband's career and her own talent.
Whether read as sensational iconography, historical fact, or something in
between, the book jacket blurb depicts the strength and persistence of an imaginary that
privileges madness and disintegration. Reading a novel, especially one described as
“autobiographical” poses challenges for Zelda’s readers. The term autobiography does
not simply point towards the similarity of a story world to the actual facts of an author’s
life; it implies that the text in fact represents them, stands in for them, can and perhaps
must be interpreted through the framework (in this case of pathology) they represent and
which has been reproduced by the author. In as much as Zelda and her life are
characterized in terms of pathology, there is a tendency to attribute the same
characteristics to the novel itself, that is, to pathologize the novel, a move which many
critics seem to make.
Mary Gordon points towards this problem in her introduction to The Collected
Writings of Zelda Fitzgerald. She writes: “real labor is required to read her without
prejudice of one sort or another, to read her not as a symbol of something but the creator
of works of art” (xvii). Certainly the fact that Zelda wrote the novel in an asylum does not
help reduce the “real labor required” on the part of readers to refrain from overdetermining mental illness in the context of the novel, to resituate its “baffling sentences”
and “puzzling words” within a discourse of language pathology and disturbed selfhood
(Collected 5). To do so, I would claim is an instance of what I call “aesthetic
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pathologization.” As Deleuze notes, “We do not write with our neurosis” (Deleuze,
“Life” 3).
Situating the novel as an emblem of Zelda’s mental illness within a discourse of
diagnoses and adumbrated medical, social and cultural contexts, has the effect, as Latour
notices, of disappearing texts and subjects into discourses themselves. The danger in
“diagnosing” texts is establishing “the fact of mental illness,” the instantiation of a circle
of reference by which the text must refer back to the illness, whereby it figures as its
product. In this manner of noncritical description, investigation of the work becomes
dramatically delimited. The critical move to pathology assigns a primacy and truth value
to psychiatric categorizations, often without properly examining the ideological
assumptions underpinning them. In effect, Zelda the author surrenders her facility to
communicate the normal, sane, and essentially unified individual extant therein.
Similarly, the novel comes to exist as a stigmatized “other” discourse; sequestered, it is
simultaneously excluded from opposed narratives of normalcy, mental health, and
perhaps even literary quality, and included as that which would be diagnosed, in need of
fixing. The resultant double bind reifies natural narrative’s mimetic bias and instantiates a
standard against which schizophrenic experience and thought, as psychosis, can be only
that (Alber et al. 114). This is not to argue that psychosis does or does not exist. It is only
to say, any story that a novel so diagnosed might articulate can only operate and mean in
a circuit of self-reference pointing back to its author’s schizophrenia, reflexively bound
by its own ligatures. Consequently, it will be read as such.
Resisting interpretation and a mimetic logic of representation as organizational
and operative concepts means disrupting the presumption of ideology, not only in regards
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to psychiatry, which I discuss in the next chapter as a network rather than a “discipline,”
but in general, and for literary studies in particular.
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Chapter2. Alliances and Allies
Précis
Even though always at risk, networks can stabilize over time depending on the
strength of the connections and associations of which they are composed. Harman notes:
“actants do not draw their power from some pristine inner hearth, but only through
assembling allies” (Prince 20) Relative to the strength or weakness of the alliances they
make, objects persist or desist. As Latour writes:
in order to spread far […] an actant needs faithful allies who accept what they are
told, identify themselves with its cause, carry out all the functions that are defined
for them, and come to its aid without hesitation when they are summoned. The
search for these ideal allies occupies the space and time of those who wish to be
stronger than others. As soon as an actor has found a somewhat more faithful ally,
it can force another ally to become more faithful in its turn (qtd. in Prince 20
italics in original).
Donna Haraway has noticed that in the alliance scheme Latour describes “all action is
agonistic” (qtd. in Gershon 172). There are winners and losers. This I think is true only if
we consider alliances and ally making in terms of a dynamics that predicates “power” and
“force” on their capacities to dominate and disenfranchise rather than in their potentials
to create and affirm.
Latour goes on to say:
Since there is nothing but weakness, power is always an impression. However,
this impression is all that is needed to change the shape of things by informing
them or impressing them. […] We always misunderstand the strength of the
strong. …it is invariably due to a tiered array of weaknesses (Pasteurization 201
italics in original).
The notion of recruiting and mobilizing allies and strengthening alliances to hedge risk
and increase the tenability of extension provides a useful way to consider how
associations encourage certain network configurations and not others. We have already
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seen how certain actors worked together (or did not) in the publication of Zelda’s novel
and speculated upon how this particular configuration may have influenced its obscurity
for more than two decades, but also how new actors have emerged resulting in
republications and its extension in derivative works, lending it strength and further
edifying its network. The same is true for the biographies that have appeared and made
possible new biographies, making alliances with previously unavailable material, thereby
increasing interest in the novel. This is discussed further below, as are the critical objects
which ally in bodies of criticism, both of which have largely taken on a project of
affirming Zelda, her novel, and her status as a writer, and particularly as a woman writer
deserving of recognition.
Acknowledgements
Even a casual glance at the “Acknowledgements” page of one of Zelda’s
biographies makes clear that biographies are themselves networks. Academic institutions,
libraries, grant giving organizations, family members, friends, museum curators,
psychiatric institutions, photoduplicators, literary agents, legal departments, and other
biographers comprise just a sample of the actors recognized in the creation, production
and distribution of these books. However, just as these actors make some circulations
possible, they also throw up barriers, divert paths and precipitate occlusions.
Kendall Taylor, for instance, recounts that Zelda’s daughter Scottie was so upset
by “conjectures about Zelda’s sexuality” in Milford’s Zelda manuscript she ordered “all
materials be returned, and all mentions of Zelda’s sexuality deleted” (xix). Scottie
threatened Milford with her own suicide (Cline 406, nt.10). Accordingly, there are no
direct references to Zelda’s “lesbianism” in the diagnosis of her schizophrenia, which

19

Bleuler considered a symptom, nor are several of her relationships fully explicated in
Milford’s text, but which Cline and Taylor explore in greater detail. Taylor notes that
“until Scottie’s death in 1986, biographers were forced to censor certain materials,” but
with the publication of Scottie’s biography, written by her daughter Eleanor, other
“suppressed information became available.” Similarly, both Taylor and biographer Sally
Cline would benefit from the release of hospital records at Craig House (Zelda fifth
hospital), and unspecified “newly discovered biographical material at Princeton” (xix).
The (non)circulation of information allows for some biographical engagements
and not others. 6 And certainly, no biography is ever entirely definitive. A “definitive
biography,” as Arnold Rampersad notes, “is palpably a virtual contradiction in terms.
[…] A facsimile or a precise definition of a life is impossible” (6). Zelda’s biographies
themselves constitute objects that not only circulate through “acknowledged” networks,
but whose actual composition occurs differentially depending on the presence or absence
of particular actors, both human – actual persons and their wishes – and nonhuman –
hospital records and mislaid documents.
Even if Milford’s biography could not yield sexuality as a possible heuristic, it did
multiply, if not create, the availability of connections to other networks, psychiatry, in
particular. Rampersad notes Nancy Milford as “the first writer to have access to a
subject’s psychiatric records.” That Milford had access to Zelda’s psychiatric records at
all, and moreover that she used them in her book, generated considerable criticism.
Milford wrote: “All hell broke loose. I had, I was told, violated medical ethics. But I

6

I have drawn mainly from the biographies of Milford, Cline and Taylor. Milford’s is the most well
known, and Taylor and Cline’s are the most current. For a detailed examination of the major biographies
about Zelda see Taylor, xix-xxi.
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wasn’t a doctor, I was a biographer and a psychiatrist’s ethics were not appropriately
mine” (qtd. in Rampersad 11). Biography and psychiatry come into contentious contact.
Twenty-one years later, Dr. Martin Orne would release tapes from his sessions with Anne
Sexton to biographer Diane Middlebrook. Both would be similarly criticized, he for
medical ethics violations and she for publishing the materials at all (12). Interestingly
though, I have found no recriminations (from psychiatrists anyway) of Scott for
reproducing Zelda’s medical reports in his novels.
Whether one finds currency in the notion that patient confidentiality survives
death, or that too much detailed attention to mental illness results in what Joyce Carol
Oates would call ‘pathography,” Milford’s inclusion of these materials undeniably
propagates points of connectivity and works to make possible the proliferation of new
objects – biographies, diversified critique, and perhaps even this thesis. The biographies
that followed Milford “act” similarly. Both Taylor and Cline’s biographies, for instance,
with their increased attention to Zelda’s treatments, bring into focus what Lisa
Appignanesi has noticed: Zelda Fitzgerald experienced nearly “the entire span of
treatments” for schizophrenia as it was understood and that had been devised “in the
twentieth century,” up until the time of her death (251). Zelda’s biographers, then, not
only tell the story of Zelda’s life, they also trace a moment in the life of psychiatry, a
shifting network of diagnostic thinking and a changing regime of treatments to which
Zelda was subjected, a conjunction of networks that become available for biographic and
critical engagement. Before discussing psychiatry in particular, I first give a brief
articulation of the novel’s critical network (the network is itself rather brief), noting how
it conjoins with the biographic.
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Critical Networks
Just as biographies reorganize around the appearance and withdrawal of actors
and connections, critical networks also assemble and reconfigure in response to the
aggregation and subtraction of actors and shifting points of connectivity. Considering the
critical pieces below as engaged in a procedure of alliance making illuminates how when
taken together they begin to form a critical network motivated towards strengthening the
novel itself as an actor, providing it with new alliances, while destabilizing others. In this
way, they allow for tracing other aspects of the novels biography, in many ways working
against the imaginary that persists regarding Zelda. Mary Wood notices this as well:
Zelda Fitzgerald's own largely unrecognized autobiographical novel challenges
the version of her life that later would be set forth by her husband in the character
of Nicole Diver. The canonical success of Tender Is the Night has helped obscure
Zelda Fitzgerald's telling of her own story and contributed to her popular image as
a strange, mentally disturbed character (249).
In 1979 Jacqueline Tavernier-Courbin notes that when literary critics have “not
completely ignored” Zelda’s novel, they have regarded it “as a literary curio, seeing as its
only value its relationship to F. Scott Fitzgerald’s work and career” (23). In 1985 Sarah
Beebe Fryer notices “the feminist movement has given rise to a flurry of critical activity
focusing on women’s forgotten writings” and that her novel, “with its uncommon
distinction of viewing from a woman’s perspective events and characters made famous
by a male author, has recently received considerable attention” (318). Ten years later,
Simone Weil Davis regards Save Me the Waltz as “a semiautobiographical novel about
the troubled marriage of two creative, dissipated American expatriates is most often read
today as a biographical companion piece to Nancy Milford’s 1970 study of the author’s
subjugation and frustrated artistry” (327). In 2002, Sally Cline will mention that
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“[b]ecause of its deeply autobiographical links, it is often read as a companion piece to
Tender is the Night” (312). In this short survey of criticism, there is actually very little
and most of what takes the novel seriously is written by women, the reception of Zelda’s
novel toggles between “literary curio,” feminist literary artifact, and “companion piece.”
In the first case, Zelda’s novel garners little recognition aside from Zelda’s status
as Scott’s wife. Tavernier-Courbin frames the novel as “simultaneously a response and a
search:”
a response to a personal situation (an unhappy marriage), to the social role its
author was expected to play as a famous writer’s wife and as the model for his
heroines, and to the universal condition that comes from simply being a woman. It
is a search for identity, a justification for the self, and an affirmation of it (24).
Similarly, Beebe-Frye explains:
Zelda Fitzgerald, often casually dismissed as Scott’s neurotic wife, deserves to be
recognized at last as a spokeswoman for the women of her generation stranded
between the old ideal of feminine subservience to men and the new ideal of
equality (325).
The popularity of Milford’s biography, which describes not only the couple’s fraught
lives together, but also Zelda’s struggle with mental illness and institutionalization, draws
readership to the novel and reconfigures its circulation. The appearance of each critical
object enlarges existing parameters of engagement with the novel and creates new spaces
within which Zelda’s novel can circulate; perhaps more importantly, these objects also
attempt to reconfigure the conditions under which considerations and circulations of the
novel occur.
The network of the novel’s criticism is seen to be organized by what John Law
would describe as a “limited number of forms of ordering”: marriage to Fitzgerald,
feminist discourse, and the appearance of Milford’s biography, which is often claimed as
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“feminist biography.” However, one can also add to these a burgeoning interest in
“madness” and its experience. In 1992 for instance, Mary E. Wood reads the novel as
participating in a shifting genre of women’s asylum autobiography, a genre whose
expectations “would shape and constrict her narrative” even as she tried to subvert them
(248). Similarly, in 2008, Lisa Appignanesi treats the broader experience of women and
madness, both in terms of their lived experience with mental illness, but also their
entanglement with the psy professions more broadly, with who she calls “the mind
doctors.” Taken together, these four themes – marriage roles, feminism, biography, and
madness –stabilize Zelda criticism, ordering a recognizable sociality of the criticism
itself.
Aside from these limited forms of ordering, it is important to realize the ways in
which the novel as an object, or in the case of Milford, the biography as an object, “bend”
criticism and create the possibility of the explorations that occur. Criticism and biography
that illuminate the particular circumstances of the novel’s creation mobilize and are
themselves mobilized in conjunction with the discourses that they claim as mediums for
their circulation. Through critical endeavors, we can recruit and engage new allies,
identify already active actors and insist (by “informing or impressing them”) they behave
differently. Such a procedure makes possible the opening up new lines of extension –
actors sent into newly opened spaces motivated by different goals and under different
terms. Zelda’s biographers and critics make allies of certain actors – feminism, women’s
writing and identity, for instance – and point out where others have been less faithful –
literary canons, gender roles, and madness. In this regard, it is clear that feminist criticism
and a handful of biographers have done the heavy lifting in generating focused attention
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for Zelda’s novel and its sustained recognition.
Just as a powerful but relatively limited amount of criticism and critics have taken
a strategy of decoupling the novel from its characterizations as “curio” or “companion
piece,” terms which limit the novel’s mobility and in which Zelda and her novel are
consumed, they also work in an extended relationship, especially with her more recent
biographers, to try and recontextualize Zelda’s madness in reference to the assumptions
which psychiatry was then working, and the diagnosis of schizophrenia as it was then
conceived. In many respects this project attempts to destabilize “the fact of Zelda’s
madness” as a defining factor for her, her imaginary, and the discussions that can be had
of her. I focus specifically on Cline’s characterization of psychiatry and its treatments as
techniques of “incarceration and control,” and her suggestion that Zelda’s diagnosis in
some part references not only a disease entity, but a corrective to what was perceived as
an unruly feminity. Both of these assertions are in many ways probably true, and I do not
wish to dismiss her claims in the manner of an apologist for psychiatry; however, I do
want to suggest that these renderings of psychiatry, schizophrenia and its treatments, in as
much as they compose complex networks and objects themselves, perpetrates a certain
kind of oversimplification regarding the motivations behind how these actants themselves
mobilized and recruited other actors, formed alliances to produce the actants in question,
and extended themselves quite apart from “incarceration and control.”
By attending to these objects and reading their history against those indexed in
Zelda’s biographical record, this thesis hopes to further illustrate what a network
approach to biographical reading might reveal concerning the ways in which the
presumption of contexts and power effects allows, to paraphrase Harman, for some
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interactions to take place and not others. By following schizophrenia, psychiatry and
treatments themselves as objects with biographies that run parallel, cross over and at
places forge connections with those of Zelda and her novel, a fuller, more complex, and
more extensive network begins to emerge. Historically speaking, Zelda’s life runs nearly
parallel to the appearance of the diagnosis and the treatments I describe.
Psychiatric Objects
I. Diagnosis
Born in 1900, Zelda was 11 years old when Eugene Bleuler introduced the term
schizophrenia to rename dementia praecox, an entity Emil Kraepelin had first
comprehensively described in his 1896 textbook Clinical Psychiatry (Woods 34). Bleuler
suggested several reasons why he advocated the change in terms. Bleuler noted that
dementia praecox (premature dementia) indicates both early onset and a resultant
dementia, neither of which was always the case. He noticed that the older term
“designates the disease, not the diseased [and] the ‘splitting’ of the different psychic
functions is one of its most characteristic” (qtd in Woods 47). Nancy C. Andreasen
explains on most points Kraepelin and Bleuler agreed. Both “stressed the importance of
defining the illness by attempting to identify a fundamental 'morbid process'” and neither
considered “psychotic symptoms, such as delusions and hallucinations…specific to
schizophrenia.” Both noticed that these, what are now called positive symptoms, occur in
other disorders as well and that “the most important defining feature was impairment in
the ability to think in a clear, fluent, and logical way” (107).
It was on the source of this impairment that Bleuler and Kraepelin would
disagree. As evidenced in his advocacy for a change in terms, Bleuler took a more
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psychological view and understood the disease as “a specific type of alteration of
thinking, feeling, and relation to the external world” (qtd. in Woods 47). On the other
hand, Kraepelin felt that there was a biological “disease process in the brain” perhaps
linked to “processes in the sexual organs” and that it might be attributable to “defective
heredity” (qtd in Woods 36). This disjuncture between a psychological and biomedical
etiology was a main point of contention within psychiatry at the time. At the end of the
day though, despite the discrepancy in models, both Bleuler and Kraepelin acknowledged
they had no idea what caused the disease. This is still essentially true today.
Whether schizophrenia, what Angela Woods describes as psychiatry’s “sublime
object or disciplinary limit point” is even equally real to recall Harman’s caveat for
objects, is a point of contention (2). However, what is clear is that schizophrenia is an
object, an actant which is allied to stabilize networks (psychiatry) and which other actors,
in this case psychiatrists (and Scott in his penultimate novel), mobilize in order to extend
themselves. Berrios, Luque, and Villagrán point out, “The history of schizophrenia can be
best described as the history of a set of research programs running in parallel rather than
seriatim and each based on a different concept of disease, of mental symptom and of
mind” (134 my italics). By the time Zelda’s institutionalizations began in 1930,
psychiatry, hoping to shake off its articulation as an “administrative profession,” was in
the process of mobilizing schizophrenia and its treatments to extend and ally itself more
strongly with biomedical medicine (Doroshow 208).
II. Treatment
While several treatments were in circulation, I describe two, “the Swiss sleeping
cure” and insulin comma therapy (ICT), in order to draw parallels between them, but also
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to illustrate in another register how viewing its dynamics in terms of agonistic actions
presents a certain kind of distortion. In addition to the “seclusion, sedatives, wet packs,
and hydrotherapy,” while in Villa E’glantine, “a unit reserved for highly disturbed
patients,” Zelda “was administered morphine and bromides rectally, preceded by an
enema” (Taylor 238 and Cline 272). Taylor explains:
Referred to as the ‘Swiss sleeping cure’, these drugs induced a prolonged narcosis
during which patients slept for one or two weeks, awakened only to eat and
relieve bladder and bowel functions. Nurses controlled each patient’s fluid intake
and administered enemas every two days. Widely used throughout Europe during
the 1920’s and 1930’s, the method had evolved from nineteenth-century ‘rest
cures’ aimed at restoring exhausted nervous systems. In theory, rest cured the sick
mind in the same way that inactivity cured the sick lung in a tuberculosis victim.
The oldest therapy known to psychiatry, sleep treatments were effective in
reducing anxiety, and provided temporary relief from depression and hysteria.
The most common formula for inducing narcosis was called ‘Cloetta’s Mixture,’
containing paraldehyde, amylene hydrate, chloral hydrate, alcohol, barbituric
acid, digitalin, and ephedrine hydrochloride, diluted with water and made into a
clear solution. Preceded by an enema ‘Cloetta’s Mixture’ was administered
rectally and induced narcosis within twenty minutes. After the long artificial
sleep, patients usually awoke relaxed and restored (235).
The range of somatic treatments that Zelda experienced, although considered by
many as barbaric, tortuous, and shameful, can be regarded as a continuum; they were not
only increasingly “medical,” they were are also regarded as increasingly “safe.” Cloettal,
or Cloetta’s Mixture, used in narcosis therapy was designed to be better tolerated and less
risky than the Somnifen which preceded it (Gillespie 46). New actants are mobilized and
new alliances are made, motivated by both a desire to increasingly medicalize the
profession, but also in regards to the safety of the treatments. Insulin coma therapy (ICT)
continues in this register. It would emerge as the next “advance” in the somatic
treatments that persisted until the appearances of benzodiazepines in the 1950’s. Eliot
Slater, of the Maudsley Hospital in London, recalled that “sleep cures” were “the only
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treatment [until ICT] we had back in the 1930s that was of any value in acute psychotic
disorders” (qtd. In Alamo, et al. 335). ICT would become ubiquitous by the 1940’s.
[ICT] involved placing psychotic patients in hypoglycemic coma through
administration of dangerously large doses of insulin, which removed glucose from
their bloodstreams. Shortly after receiving their doses, patients would begin to
grimace and jerk, sweating profusely as they lost consciousness. …After
remaining in death-like comas ranging anywhere from a few minutes to several
hours, they would be lifted back to consciousness with a sugar solution. Often,
psychiatrists observed that their patients’ symptoms would temporarily vanish in
what they deemed a “lucid period.” If the treatment was successful, the lucid
period would gradually increase in length until it displaced all abnormal behavior.
In a typical course of insulin treatment, a patient could be expected to undergo
five or six shocks, or comas, per week for several weeks or even months, until his
or her psychiatrist declared him either recovered or incurable (Doroshow 214).
A decade after insulin was found to treat and control diabetes Manfred Sakel tried
giving insulin to morphine addicts in Vienna and noticed that the treatment eased
withdrawal symptoms. Later, he would try insulin in psychotics and also observed
improvement. It was not until after animal experimentation, “allegedly in his own
kitchen,” that Sakel would find that the induced hypoglycemia could be reversed and that
“deeper levels of induced coma achieved.” In 1933, Sakel was allowed to practice his
technique at the University Clinic in Vienna. Over four months between November of
1934 and February of 1935, Sakel would publish 13 reports claiming 88% improvement
rates in patients (Jones 147). By 1939, with private funding, Sakel would open the Sakel
Foundation, a specialized school to train physicians in the treatment (Taylor 347).
In some ways the advent of this therapy would act to bridge the gap between
Kraepelin’s biomedical and Bleuler’s psychological models for schizophrenia. In as
much ICT was almost exclusively administered to those with a diagnosis of
schizophrenia, the treatment can be said to work to make schizophrenia “more faithful” to
the medical model it was helping to entrench (Doroshow 226). This alliance would occur
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locally in the rooms and clinics where the treatment would stabilize its network.
Doroshow argues that ICT emerged as “a technology that permitted psychiatry to be
thought of as a medical subspecialty” (228). She notices that the procedure not only acted
to reorganize psychiatry’s self-perception, but the hospital itself.
More than prior treatments like sedation or cold water packs, which could be
given anywhere, ICT called for the creation of a special space in which it could be
administered. The insulin unit, as it came to be known, was a room with its own
staff, tools, and character, understood as a vital component of ICT’s curative
effects. …Specialized experience was prized and served as a basis for choosing
the space’s actors… [O]n the small, interpersonal level of the mental hospital,
administering ICT was also a means of making psychiatry a more legitimately
medical field. The insulin unit became an analog of spaces common to the general
hospital: an operating room of sorts during the therapy, an intensive care unit
during the coma itself, and an emergency room when any complications arose”
(220).
Although nearly all of Zelda’s psychiatrists and physicians would adopt the
treatment, when Zelda would actually come into contact with ICT is somewhat unclear.
However, a thorough examination of how the treatment circulated provides some clues.
In 1937, Sakel would present a paper in New York where Adolf Meyer, Zelda’s
psychiatrist at Phipps Clinic at Johns Hopkins (her fourth hospital), was in attendance.
Meyer would introduce the treatment at his clinic and also recommend it to Dr. Caroll
who would treat Zelda at Highland in North Carolina, her last hospital. Zelda entered
Highland in 1936 and would remain there intermittently for the rest of her life. Here she
received both ICT as well as electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). Taylor speculates that
Zelda probably underwent ICT, as well as ECT, at Sheppard Pratt in Baltimore (her sixth
and penultimate hospital) while the treatments were in experimental stages. Based on
correspondence from Zelda’s last psychiatrist, Dr. Irving Pine, Cline has dated Zelda’s
reception of insulin shock as early as her admittance at Prangins in 1930 (Cline 286) and
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confirms that Zelda was among the experimental group at Pratt, where she would be
transferred after Prangins (Cline 350). Cline’s version of events seems accurate.
Edward Shorter and David Healy note that even before the conference in 1937,
“the Swiss psychiatric scene had been heavily infiltrated by insulin therapy.” ICT had
become popular “at market-oriented private nervous clinics … German patients were said
to flock to these private clinics seeking a recovery in order to avoid being sterilized under
Nazi eugenic legislation back home.” Shorter and Healy specifically mention Prangins
and Forel. In addition, insulin therapy had been well established in university centers and
Prof. Henri Claude, who Zelda had seen on her first hospitalization at Malmaison, was a
practitioner (52-53). Zelda would receive the treatment intermittently until her death in
1948. In the 1950’s, the procedure would disappear.
III. Sickness
By following ICT (and at the same Zelda) we arrive at a tracing of the dynamic
alliances being formed in the network of psychiatry and that Zelda’s biographies only
partially reveal. Following the treatments themselves arrives at a complex assemblage of
motivations – reduced toxicity of compounds, an increasingly biomedicalized model of
disease and practice, a concern with safety and efficacy. 7 A relatively small number of
practitioners operating during the time were closely and powerfully allied. Sakel made
strong alliances with insulin and schizophrenia, alliances further extended in training
centers, which would act to materially reconfigure the profession of psychiatry and the
hospital itself. Doroshow reveals the ubiquity of the treatment stemmed from the fact that
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What is interesting to note is the narrow metaphorical range that sleeping cure and coma therapy
describe. A continually ratcheted up intensity of “resting” is combined with an increasingly
technologized notion of therapy.
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those participating in the “local world” where ICT was administered believed in its
efficacy because they empirically witnessed its effects. Doroshow discusses efficacy “as
an understanding of how well something works that is based not only on whether it
would work objectively in a sociocultural vacuum, but also on an understanding of the
subject in question as embedded within its sociocultural context” (219 italics in original).
Those who administered the therapy saw that it worked and “ICT was experienced as an
effective treatment for schizophrenia” (Doroshow 219 italics in original). Tracing the
emergence of ICT and its strong alliance to schizophrenia illuminates a network largely
motivated and ordered by notions of efficacy and the biomedical professionalization of
psychiatry; taking the local world of early twentieth century psychiatry into account
complicates Cline’s reduction of treatments to “methods of control.”
I quote Cline at length:
Zelda’s medical condition plays a key role in this biography. I was
fortunate in being given access to most medical records now available and was
allowed to read those hitherto under seal. I also spoke twice to Zelda’s last
psychiatrist, [Dr. Irving Pine] who held a different view of her diagnoses from
that recorded in the [Zelda] legend.
I looked at how the label schizophrenia was applied to women. Evidence
suggests that Zelda’s failure to conform to a traditional feminine role has, to some
extent, been buried within a diagnosis of mental disorder. Zelda was a courageous
woman who struggled to maintain her sanity in the face of the horrific treatments
she was forced to undergo. It became obvious that she suffered as much from the
treatments as from the illness itself. My particular challenge was to try to separate
the illness from treatment.
Zelda’s hospital label in the Thirties was schizophrenia; by the Fifties her
last psychiatrist suggested (too late) that it might have been manic depression.
Though the treatments for these mental diagnoses in periods separated by two
decades were somewhat (though curiously, not entirely) different, that difference
had less to do with diagnoses than with methods of control considered
appropriate during each era. If letters and journals from other women patients in
the Fifties/Sixties/Seventies are compared with Zelda’s of the Thirties/Forties, we
see that emotions engendered in all absentee mothers and artists inside closed
institutions were remarkably similar. Fear, frustration, resentment and despair
attached themselves to incarceration, imprisonment, enclosure (9 my italics).
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I want to draw attention to the manner in which Cline contextualizes her
discussion of Zelda, her diagnosis, and her treatments, and how it augments but differs
from the network I have briefly traced and articulated by following ICT. Cline presents
hospitalization, psychiatry and the treatments it mobilized during Zelda’s life in terms of
“incarceration and control.” As a reductive and somewhat totalizing context, this seems
an oversimplified rendition of hegemonic forces exerting themselves downward.
Similarly, I want to suggest that Clines’ “challenge… to separate the illness from
treatment,” by which I understand her to mean the causes, symptoms, and experience of
Zelda’s illness on the one hand, and the effects of her treatment, as experienced and as
instrumental in progressing the course of the illness itself on the other, also perpetrates an
oversimplification. As Kleinman, Good, and Eisenberg suggest:
Modern physicians diagnose and treat diseases (abnormalities in the structure and
function of body organs and systems), whereas patients suffer illnesses
(experiences of disvalued changes in states of being and in social function; the
human experience of sickness). Illness and disease, so defined, do not stand in a
one-to-one relation. […] Both concepts are explanatory models mirroring
multilevel relations between separate aspects of a complex, fluid, total
phenomenon: sickness (251, 252).
These terms, then, as Kleinman et al. claim, are perhaps better imagined as
mutually constituted in a recursive and shifting network of illness, disease, and treatment
–a confluence of diagnosis, disease, the experience of illness, and clinical practices.
Certainly, the characters of these relations change, both locally and over time, for better
or for worse; however, to say the treatments Zelda suffered had “less to do with
diagnoses than with methods of control considered appropriate during each era” offers
too overdetermined an image of psychiatry and its history, not to mention of what we can
mean by the terms social and cultural, which are also implicated. It significantly limits
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how all of these registers articulate together as a historically shifting and “total
phenomenon.” Effectively, Cline’s representations separate Zelda, her body, and her
experience to one side, and her diagnosis, psychiatry and its treatments to the other.
Instead of a network of relations, an assemblage populated by multiple actors with
varying motivations, we receive Zelda in agonistic opposition to the social, medical, and
institutional forces that she is subjected to and that acted to control her.
While this description works to weaken the association between Zelda and the
fact of her madness in the imaginary, what it does not do is to give critical access to a
larger network with which Zelda came perhaps tragically into contact. I would suggest,
then, that what a biographic network approach allows criticism to accomplish is the
mapping of a larger landscape and fuller accounting of the actors and objects that
populate it, as well as their interactions, in the hopes of identifying the “tiered array of
weaknesses” by which “the strength of the strong” is misunderstood. This does not mean
bracketing subjective experience and pain, but it does mean setting aside a notion of
forces which are found in themselves definitive, and irresistible. As Harman notes, “What
is truly interesting about ‘contexts’ is not that they utterly define every entity to the core,
but that they open a space where certain interactions can take place and not others.”
Sickness “as a complex, fluid, total phenomenon” suggests the assemblage of whole
worlds.
IV: A Passage
“I must be very thin,” she thought. The bedpan cut her spine, and her
hands looked like bird claws. They clung to the air like claws to a perch, hooking
the firmament as her right to a footrest. Her hands were long and frail and blue
over the knuckles like an unfeathered bird.
Sometimes her foot hurt so terribly that she closed her eyes and floated off
on the waves of the afternoon. Invariably she went to the same delirious place.
There was a lake there so clear that she could not tell the bottom from the top; a
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pointed island lay heavy on the waters like an abandoned thunderbolt. […]
Nebulous weeds swung on the current: purple stems with fat animal leaves, long
tentacular stems with no leaves at all, swishing balls of iodine and the curious
chemical growths of stagnant waters. Crows cawed from one deep mist to
another. The word “sick” effaced itself against the poisonous air and jittered
lamely about between the tips of the island and halted on the white road that ran
straight through the middle. “Sick” turned and twisted about the narrow ribbon of
the highway like a roasting pig on a spit, and woke Alabama gouging at her
eyeballs with the prongs of its letters.
Sometimes she shut her eyes and her mother brought her a cool lemonade,
but this happened only when she was not in pain (Fitzgerald 180).
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The Thesis: Lines of Flight
In discussing the network of Zelda’s novel as it appears against her biographic
material and mapping the ways in which biographic and critical networks are constituted
and ordered in relationship to one another perhaps does not register a great deal of noise
in the thesis. However, jumping off and tracing the network of ICT – through the streets
of Vienna, Sakel’s kitchen, into the local worlds of hospitals, and further, following the
emergence of ICT as it was mobilized by a relatively small number of practitioners to
realign psychiatric practice more closely to biomedicine – appears tangential, disjunctive,
or diverting. In the rhizome of the biographic network which follows Zelda’s novel, ICT
emerges as site of rupture, figuring as a line of flight, a line down which the thesis flees
when psychiatry, diagnosis, and treatment destabilize and become unpredictable actors
within the overall network.
Deleuze and Guattari write:
Every rhizome contains lines of segmentarity according to which it is stratified
territorialized, organized, signified, and attributed, etc., as well as lines of
deterritorialization down which it constantly flees. There is a rupture in the
rhizome whenever segmentary lines explode into a line of flight, but the line of
flight is part of the rhizome. These lines always tie back to one another (Thousand
9).
As Deleuze and Guattari explain above, and Latour and Harman detail at the beginning of
this chapter, networks or assemblages are not static nor are they inherently stable; they
shift and reconfigure depending on the movements of various actors and the allegiances
made between them. Alliances dissolve and seemingly stable structures break apart,
resulting in new transformations. In as much as this thesis engages a project of mapping a
dynamic biographic network, it is similarly unstable, prone to reorganization, to sites of
rupture resulting in new lines. But, “These lines always tie back together.” Deleuze and
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Guattari write:
That is why one can never posit a dualism or a dichotomy, even in a
rudimentary form of the good and bad. You may make a rupture, draw a line of
flight, yet there is still a danger that you will reencounter organizations that
restratify everything, formations that restore power to a signifier, attributions that
reconstitute a subject…(9).
Cline’s move to separate out Zelda’s sickness, diagnosis, and regimes of
treatments in many ways intends to incite a rupture in the biographic imaginary; however,
exposing diagnosis and treatment as methods by which incarceration and control are
achieved simply reproduces the power to be disrupted, reconstitutes Zelda as incarcerated
and controlled, and reinstantiates psychiatric hegemony as ideology. Noticing and
drawing ICT as a line of flight, the thesis seeks to deterritorialize psychiatry by also
recognizing efficacy and a paradigmatic shift away from the administration of bodies as
motivations. So then, what may seem a strange proliferation of objects and discussions in
the thesis are found to be a line of flight down which it flees. While tracing the biography
of ICT appears disconnected or disjointed from the map the thesis has been tracing
(because it is), this line nevertheless remains part of the rhizome itself. And of course,
just as the biographic rhizome being traced contains ruptures and shoots, there are many
ruptures throughout the thesis, lines of flight which might have been followed.
Many have been excerpted, and do not appear here: medical metaphor (the
historical continuum of rest, sleep, and comma whose increasingly acute register of
“resting” as curative for nervousness); discussions of how reading criticism as a
biographic network resists ideological critical projects in the context of Marxism;
discussions of Zelda’s visual art and her as of yet unpublished manuscript Caesar’s
Things which is housed at Princeton in manuscript and facsimile and on my computer as
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a digital file; or, an interrogation of how critical reception of the novel (and her visual art)
reads against a general distrust of modernist aesthetics at the time. This list is not
exhaustive, but they are never the less available for tracing.
The thesis, then, approximates (or attempts to) what Deleuze and Guattari notice
as “the ideal for a book,” which would “lay out everything… on a single page, the same
sheet: lived events, historical determinations, concepts, individuals, groups, social
formations” (9). This thesis performs only one possible tracing of the rhizome which
moves back and forth and transversally across a “single sheet of paper,” making allies
and alliances with some but not others of the actors which populate it. However,
engaging any of these myriad actors can effect transformations in the network, and
refigure the complexity of the objects themselves in regards to the work that they do as
their connections multiply or diminish. What Harman has noted of the literary work –
“we cannot identify the literary work with the exact current form it happens to have” –
applies to other objects as well, such as diagnosis, psychiatry, treatments, and this thesis
(“Hammer” 202). A biographical network approach recognizes many biographies running
against one another, unfolding simultaneously across the page, and at points tying
together, breaking apart, and reconverging. The thesis unfolds, then, a rendition of a
biography, a life – which is the topic of the concluding chapter.
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Chapter 3: Conclusion
Biographic Life
This thesis employs a network (assemblage) approach to address the bifurcation
between human and nonhuman and subject and object, binaries which are not precisely
the same thing, but in as much as they are ontologically prescriptive obtain the same
result. It also attempts to develop a literary critical project that considers biography in a
more expansive way, suggesting that literary objects also have “life stories” which can be
read against and with those of its authors. In this regard the thesis has mapped in broad
strokes the appearance and travels of Zelda’s novel and its various alliances with the
biographies which include it and a body of criticism concerned with it. It has also mapped
in a brief way relevant psychiatric treatments, the historical contexts in which they
participate, and their relationship to Zelda and her novel have been considered.
Yet, as a tentative conclusion, the inquiries this thesis makes can be extended
further, a space opened to deal with a larger question implicit in the bifurcation of human
and nonhuman and subject and object. How do these divisions relate to a question of life
itself? What can be meant by a literary work or a biography when considered in the
context of a life? Or all taken together, as Deleuze asks: what is “a life”?
In his book, The Nonhuman Environment in Normal Development and in
Schizophrenia, psychiatrist Harold F. Searles notices the anxiety that humans feel when
“overcome by the unmanipulability of a mechanical device, or the seemingly impossible
complexity of a home-carpentry job, or the seemingly unrecognizable chaos of figures
and …regulations which flood us when we start to cope with an income-tax return” (39).
This anxiety he claims is a residue from an infantile period where the child is
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undifferentiated from his environment, and vice-versa. He writes:
Not only do we have unconscious memory traces of our infantile experiences in
which we are surrounded by a chaotically uncontrollable nonhuman environment
that we sensed as being a part of us; in addition we presumably have unconscious
memory traces of our experience with losing that nonhuman environment which
had been sensed, heretofore, as a harmonious extension of our world-embracing
self (39).
There is, then, “a deeply rooted anxiety of a double-sort: the anxiety of subjective
oneness with a chaotic world, and the anxiety over the loss of a cherished, omnipotent
world-self” (39). Searles goes on to discuss how these twin anxieties operate in both
“normal development,” as seen in the examples above, and in schizophrenia, as when a
patient regards another person as being animal, or inanimate, or feels themselves to be
this way. We always toggle, then, between these residues of being-one-with and beingseparate-from – an anxiety that the inanimate can become human and that we ourselves
might become inanimate. Latour has captured something of this when he asserts “the
Subject/Object opposition is troublesome only if we take these two terms as distinct
ontological regions, whereas it is only a matter of a slight difference between two
groups.” The issue of “subjectivity and objectivity” he suggests, has been “merely
exaggerated, to the point of making an incontrovertible foundation out of something that
should always have remained just a convenience of organization” (Modes 290-291 italics
in original). When what Harman calls “the post-Kantian obsession with a single relational
gap between people and objects” is reconsidered, subjectivity can be reimagined
(Quadruple 6).
For Searles subjectivity is not given, as is implied in the opposition of human and
nonhuman (as life and nonlife); rather, it results from a process of differentiating oneself
as apart from the environment – a human and nonhuman collective – of which they are a
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part. He conceives of subjectivity as a movement, only ever partially complete, that
“recapitulates the phylogenesis of the human race… the evolutionary history of the
human race” from its beginnings “in an entirely inorganic world” and proceeding through
to life:
in its broad outlines such a recapitulation does actually take place, namely, that
the earliest rudiments of the human ego may experience existence as being totally
inorganic, totally inanimate, including itself, followed by later phases of
experiencing itself as something living but not yet human, and only later still
experiencing an awareness of oneself as a living, individual human being. […]
[T]he human being is engaged, throughout his lifespan, in an unceasing struggle
to differentiate himself increasingly fully, not only from his human, but also from
this nonhuman environment (40, 30).
What Searles has described as the infantile “world-embracing” undifferentiated
state of “subjective oneness” where all subjects and objects are “a part of us,” as well “a
harmonious extension” of us, our “omnipotent world-self,” Deleuze calls immanence.
Immanence, like Searles’ notion of “subjectivity” has no telos, but is always processual.
“What is immanence? A life…” (Deleuze, Immanence 28).
A life is everywhere, in all the moments that a given living subject goes through
and that are measured by given lived objects: an immanent life carrying with it the
events or singularities that are merely actualized in subjects and objects. This
indefinite life does not itself have moments, close as they may be one to another,
but only between-times, between-moments; it doesn't just come about or come
after but offers the immensity of an empty time where one sees the event yet to
come and already happened, in the absolute of an immediate consciousness
(Immanence 29).
A life for Deleuze is a process, a flow, a becoming that is “merely actualized in
subjects and objects,” what I believe Latour articulates “as a convenience of
organization.” In many ways Deleuze’s concept is inorganic and impersonal, analogous
to the recapitulating phylogenic process that Searles describes. Nevertheless, it is vital. In
a sense, it is evolutionary. Its vitality does not reside within, but entirely without, on the
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outside, with the outside where it occurs.
Likewise, literary works for Deleuze approximate “experiments” in becoming that
emerge with writing: “Writing is inseparable from becoming” (Critical 1). An
assemblage attempts to articulate the perpetual emergence of this becoming and the
“organization” that occurs with it. This is why Deleuze and Guattari can write:
There is no longer a tripartite division between a field of reality (the world) and a
field of representation (the book) and a field of the subjectivity (the author).
Rather, an assemblage establishes connections between certain multiplicities
drawn from each of these orders, so that a book has no sequel nor the world as its
object nor one of several authors as its subject…one cannot write sufficiently in
the name of an outside. The outside has no image, no signification, no
subjectivity. The book as assemblage with the outside, against the book as image
of the world (Thousand 23).
The collapse of the tripartite division of world, book and author is why this thesis –
considering that biographical practices can attempt to approach a life, if even in a small
and incomplete way through assemblage work – has suggested the terms articulation and
emergence as enhancements to interpretation and representation, in as much as the latter
terms tend to reproduce ideology in the production of a world that is divided from the
content of the novel as a productive force.
There is no difference between what a book talks about and how it is made. […]
We will never ask what a book means…We will ask what it functions with, in
connection with what other things does it or does not transmit
intensities…Literature is an assemblage. It has nothing to do with ideology. There
is no ideology and never has been (Thousand 4).
Focusing on the novel itself and on the objects – criticism, biographies, psychiatry and so
on – with which it “transmits intensities,” maps an assemblage, moments in a becoming.
A practice of reading biographically attempts to capture in some measure the flow of a
life.

42

Coda I
Writing is inseparable from becoming: in writing one becomes-woman, becomesanimal or vegetable, becomes-molecule to the point of becoming
imperceptible.[…] To become is not to attain a form (identification, imitation,
Mimesis) but to find a zone of proximity, indiscerniability, or indifferentiation
where one can no longer be distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a
molecule – neither imprecise or general, but unforeseen and nonprexistant,
singularized out of a population rather than determined in a form (Deleuze
Immanence 1).

Coda II
Yellow roses she bought with her money like Empire satin brocade, and white
lilacs and pink tulips like molded confectioner’s frosting, and deep-red roses like
a Villon poem, black and velvety as an insect wing, cold blue hydrangeas clean as
a newly calcimined wall, the crystalline drops of lily of the valley, a bowl of
nasturtiums like beaten brass, anemones pieced out of wash material, and
malignant parrot tulips scratching the air with their jagged barbs, and the
voluptuous scrambled convolutions of Parma violets. She bought lemon-yellow
carnations perfumed with the taste of hard candy, and garden roses purple as
raspberry puddings, and every kind of white flower the florist knew how to grow.
She gave Madame gardenias like white kid gloves and forget-me-nots from the
Madeleine stalls, threatening sprays of gladioli, and the soft, even purr of black
tulips. She bought flowers like salads and flowers like fruits, jonquils and
narcissus, poppies and ragged robins, and flowers with the brilliant carnivorous
qualities of Van Gogh. She chose from windows filled with metal balls and cactus
gardens of the florists near the rue de la Paix, and from the florists uptown who
sold mostly plants and purple iris, and from florists on the Left Bank whose shops
were lumbered up with the wire frames of designs, and from outdoor markets
where the peasants dyed their roses to a bright apricot, and stuck wires through
the heads of the dyed peonies (Fitzgerald 130).
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The Thesis: Conclusion
This thesis began self-consciously by considering itself as an object that has
emerged from a preexisting network of associations and activities that are not
immediately present. It ends, then, in a similar fashion by looking back at the biographic
assemblage it has attempted to trace and of which it recognizes itself a part. It has, in
broad strokes, articulated a critical literary practice conducted in an ontologically
reoriented space of collectivity that recognizes humans and nonhumans as active and
engaged participants in the production of a dynamic, constantly shifting, and expanding
biographic assemblage; this thesis, itself an assemblage and an actor in the assemblage it
traces, provides a map of that practice’s unfolding. Attempting this project at all grew
from a general distrust in traditional literary criticism’s default practice – interpretation –
and logic – mimetic representation – to facilitate a discussion of Zelda’s novel in a
manner which would resist reproducing the overdetermined themes which continue to
stabilize her imaginary. As Mary Gordon noticed, it is difficult to read Zelda without
referring to what she symbolizes because the biographical record is so well known.
Eschewing the bifurcation of human and nonhuman allowed for the consideration
of the novel itself as an object that could be followed through the network in which it was
produced and from which it emerged into the literary field. Attending to the novel as
actor shifted critical focus away from its interior, the “text” or content, displaced
hermeneutics as a strategy, and cleared a space to consider the broader networks and
assemblages in which the novel is continually rearticulated through biographies, critical
work, new novels, and this thesis. This move also allowed for a reconsideration of
psychiatry through the lens of its treatments, ICT in particular, which resulted in a line of

44

flight by which diagnosis and treatment were found overdetermined in discourse,
rendering Zelda and her novel as historical products representative of it effects.
Mobilizing the notion of network as an analytic tool provides a means of
regarding Save Me apart from Zelda’s own intention or the critical activities of an
interpreter. In fact, it may even call traditional critique into question in as much as it
interrogates the primacy of the critic in delineating the value of any work of art outside of
the context of the life in which it figures as its expression, or in Deleuze’s term, “an
experiment.” Drawing on Searles and Deleuze, I have brought forward a view of life as
processual, vital, and immediate: a notion of becoming that can accommodate the
conceptualization of biography that I have proposed and that recognizes writing as “an
experiment” in the becoming of a life which is inseparable from it and the multiplicity of
actors with and against with it occurs.
The notions of network and immanence (“a life”), then, provide heuristics and
alternative avenues for criticism which might prove instructive as a “method” for dealing
with other texts remaining relatively obscured at the margins of literary consciousness.
Rather than provide a close reading of the novel, the thesis has juxtaposed passages of the
novel which “share intensities” with the lines of the rhizome being traced: for instance,
the assemblage of a world around “sick(ness)” or the many becomings – woman,
vegetable, metal, molecule, imperceptible – that flowers obtain as they are “singularized
out of a population rather than determined in form.” The intention and presumed use of
the biographic network approach the thesis has attempted to develop, much in the way of
an experiment, has been to singularize Zelda and her novel out of a population of other
possible lives and works, but undetermined in form.
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